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Functional or structural separation to deal with vertical foreclosure 
effects in the electronic communications industry, pending the 
Second British Telecoms Review (2015).  
 
Abstract 
 
The paper tackles the discussion about vertical separation in the electronic 
communications sector, in its two main forms functional and structural. The author 
will argue how mandatory structural separation under certain conditions could be a 
possible option. The evidence is provided by the analysis of recent commitment 
decisions adopted by the European Commission in the energy sector, and by 
structural separation undertakings signed in Australia and New Zealand in the past 
few years. The paper considers the theoretical background, such as the various 
forms of separation identified by the OECD in 2001 and 2011, but also the current 
discussion around the Second Telecoms Review (2005-2015) in the United 
Kingdom.  
 
Keywords: vertical structural separation, functional separation, regulation, abuse, 
dominance, essential facilities, commitments, electronic communications 
 
Dr Pierluigi Congedo* 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This paper tackles the discussion about vertical separation (separation of vertically-
integrated parts of an undertaking, such as the network) in the electronic 
communications sector, in its two main forms: functional and structural. The author 
will argue how negotiated and even mandatory structural separation under certain 
conditions could be a possible option. 
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In the last decades the hypothesis of adopting structural remedies in the electronic 
communications sector, at least at US level, lost the favour recorded in the 1980s.  
 
The Harvard School advocates in favour of antitrust intervention to deal with market 
structure hindering competition, and how separation may actually reduce the 
structural competitive advantage that the incumbent may have in the market. The 
Chicago School looks instead at economic efficiency reasons, and is generally 
keener to adopt less invasive solutions and put behavioural remedies (i.e. functional 
separation) on top of the competition enforcement agenda, only if and after 
regulatory tools have shown their inadequacy. 
 
Also the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (‘OECD’) recently 
took in a Recommendation on structural separation adopted on the 13 December 
2011 (published in January 2012)1, showing how, at inter-governmental level, the 
position changed in the last decade, in favour of ‘á la carte’ enforcement solutions, 
departing from the position expressed in 2001, more favourable to structural 
separation.  
 
It is a very useful document that, alongside with a Report on structural separation 
published at the same time, stresses how the choice of the most suitable form of 
(horizontal or vertical) separation should follow a case-by-case approach, on the 
basis of the evaluation of two main factors:  
 
1. The advantages and disadvantages that the separation may determine in 
competition terms;  
2. The costs and benefits that the separation may determine.  
                                                          
 
* LL.M. (ULB), Ph.D. in Law (King’s College London), Solicitor of the Law Society, Cassation Court 
Avvocato in Rome, module teacher of EU Competition Law, LUISS Guido Carli, Rome and La 
Sapienza, Rome, collaborateur scientifique, Institut d’Etudes Européennes, Université Libre de 
Bruxelles, Brussels.  
The author takes personal responsibility of the opinion expressed. 
 
1
 OECD Report 2011 ‘Report on Experiences with Structural Separation’, OECD pub. 2012, p 10, 
accessible at http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/50056685.pdf 
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If this two-fold approach is correct, I am prone to add a third, decisive, factor to be 
borne in mind in favour of structural separation: the importance of deterrence. The 
threat of structural separation could be dropped at a later stage (for instance while 
negotiating commitments), finally adopting behavioural-based solutions.  
 
After having discussed the evolution of the OECD approach, I will analyse the 
current position of the doctrine, both at legal and economic level.  
 
Among various authors, Prof. Martin Cave played a decisive role in the United 
Kingdom in explaining how ‘replicability’ of infrastructures is of paramount 
importance to boost network-based competition, going beyond the pressure on the 
local access incumbent to open its network (i.e. through ex ante regulatory tools), or 
through mandatory divestiture of the network (through ex post enforcement tools). 
Martin Cave’s ‘ladder of investments’ scheme2 influenced the current debate at 
European level on access to networks, in addition to the influence that OECD reports 
on separation might have had on regulators and competition authorities. All these 
positions were kept in consideration during the debate (what is considered the First 
British Telecoms Review 2005) preceding BT’s functional separation and the 
creation of the separate access division, Openreach in 20063.  
 
I will also make reference to specific experiences such as the creation of Openreach 
as a separate division within BT’s group for the electronic communications sector, 
                                                          
 
2
 CAVE, Six Degrees of Separation, Operational Separation as a Remedy in European 
Telecommunications Regulation, in Communications & strategies, 2006, 89ff. See also CAVE - 
DOYLE, Network separation and investment incentives in telecommunications’ University of Warwick, 
MEC 1521, 2007, 1-32. 
 
3
 See in particular OECD, Restructuring Public Utilities for Competition, Competition Law and Policy, 
Paris, 2001, 1-95; OECD, Competition and Regulation Issues in Telecommunications,  Competition 
Law and Policy, Paris, 2002; OECD, Report on Structural Separation,  Journal of Competition Law 
and Policy, 1-65; OECD, OECD Report 2011 ‘Report on Experiences with Structural Separation’, 
Paris, 2006, ,  10, accessible at http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/50056685.pdf. 
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and to the commitments decisions in the cases EO.N4, RWE5 and ENI6 (2008-2010) 
in the energy sector that led to structural separation.  
 
After a short analysis of the OECD position on functional and structural separation, 
the following sections highlight the reasoning behind the choice of functional 
separation rather than structural separation when British Telecom negotiated the 
undertakings that led to the creation of Openreach as a separated division within the 
same group. The section on Openreach is aimed at clarifying the advantages and 
the disadvantages that functional separation entails. I will then focus on the 
advantages and disadvantages of structural separation, on the basis not only of the 
AT&T case but also looking at the remedies adopted with respect to the energy 
sector and to a recent case of structural separation adopted in Australia dealing with 
the national incumbent: Telstra. 
 
The last section contains conclusive remarks on structural separation and an 
analysis of the doctrine of Martin Cave on ‘degrees of separation’, opening the path 
to a new approach towards structural separation, as a remedy that can be 
considered to be the most convincing form of deterrent that the enforcer, the 
European Commission, can put forward in exercising its prerogatives on the basis of 
Art. 7 of Regulation 1/2003/EC. 
 
 
2. The OECD position in the last decade. From the 2001 Recommendation 
on structural separation to the 2011 Report and amended 
Recommendation. 
 
                                                          
4
 Commission Decision E.ON (Case COMP/38.388-38.389) of 26 November 2008, [2009] OJ C36/8 of 
13 February 2009, accessible at 
http://ec/europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39388/39388_2796_3.pdf. 
 
5
 Commission Decision RWE (Gas Foreclosure) (Case COMP/39.402) of 18 March 2009, Summary of 
the decision in [2009] OJ C133/10 of 12 June 2009 accessible at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39402/39402_576_1.pdf 
 
6
 Commission Decision ENI (Case COMP/39.315) of 29 September 2010, [2010] OJ C352/8 of 23 
December 2010, accessible at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39315/39315_3019_9.pdf. 
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In 2001 the OECD issued a ‘Recommendation [of the Council]7 on structural 
separation in regulated industries’ stating that policies aimed at boosting competition 
can be broadly divided in two types: (i) those primarily addressing the ‘incentives of 
the regulated firms’ (such as vertical ownership separation), called ‘structural 
policies’, and (ii) those primarily addressing the ability of the regulated firms to deny 
access (for instance, imposing access separation), which may be called ‘behavioural 
policies’. 
 
In 2001 the OECD forum recognised that ‘structural’ policies, though the most 
difficult to adopt, could be the most suitable. Ten years later , in 2011, the same 
forum admitted that in certain circumstances ‘behavioural’ remedies (accounting 
separation, functional separation) «may play a useful and important role in 
supporting certain policies such as access regulation», somehow modifying the 
approach held one decade earlier8.  
 
On the one hand, the decision-making process in favour of a structural remedy in 
regulated industries often requires high-profile and sensitive trade-offs, 
independence from the regulated industry, high expertise, and transparency in 
assessing the competitive effects. On the other hand, behavioural remedies may not 
entirely eliminate «the incentive of the regulated firm to restrict competition and 
therefore may be less effective […] at facilitating competition than structural 
remedies»’9. 
 
First of all, the OECD Report 2001 identifies the tools for protecting and promoting 
competition, applicable to all the regulated industries (electronic communications, 
energy, railways, postal sectors) distinguishing the so-called (i) ‘access regulation’ 
                                                          
7
 OECD, Recommendation of the Council concerning structural separation in regulated industries, 26 
April 2001, C (2001) 78/FINAL, Paris, 2001.  
 
 
8
 ibid, 3. 
 
9
 ibid. 
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from (ii) ‘ownership separation’, (iii) ‘club ownership’ and (iv) ‘operational 
separation’10.  
 
Access regulation (regulatory approach) follows the following scheme: 
 
 
 
 
 
Terms and conditions of access are determined 
by the regulators  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure no. 1: Access Regulation (source: OECD Report 2001, p 12) 
 
The regulator intervenes to fix the prices of access to the non-competitive activity, 
i.e. the access to the infrastructure («the regulator sets these terms and conditions to 
facilitate competition downstream between rival firm and the competitive component 
of the integrated firm»11).  
 
                                                          
10
 ibid, 11-15 
 
 
11
 ibid, 11. 
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activity 
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activity  
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DRAFT  - to be published in (2015) Vol 2 no. 12, Italian Antitrust Review 
 
7 
 
But what if the regulatory approach (as in the case Deutsche Telekom12 or 
Telefónica13 where the incumbent put in place margin squeeze practices even 
applying the tariffs set by the German telecoms regulator), does not work?  
The possibility introduced by Directive 2009/140/EC in the electronic 
communications sector, on the basis of the British precedent, is functional 
separation; whilst in the energy sector since 2009 the alternative is structural, 
ownership separation.  
 
The OECD Report 2001 had already foreseen these two possibilities. The following 
figures depict how both ownership separation and club ownership work.  
 
The first (ownership separation) is implemented through the vertical separation of the 
non-competitive activity (the network) and the competitive activity (the services): 
«under this approach the owner of the non-competitive part has no incentive to 
discriminate or distinguish artificially between competing firms in the competitive 
activity»14: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
12
 Commission Decision Deutsche Telekom AG (Case COMP/C-1/37.451, 37.578, 37.579), [2003] OJ 
L263/9; on appeal, Deutsche Telekom AG v. Commission, Case T-271/03, [2008] ECR II 477; before 
the ECJ, Deutsche Telekom AG v European Commission, Case C-280/08, [2010] ECR I-09555, 
[2010] 5 CMLR 1495. 
 
13
 Commission Decision Wanadoo España v Telefónica [2008] OJ C83/6 (‘Telefónica’), appealed at 
the General Court: Case T-336/07 Telefónica and Telefónica de España v Commission [2007] OJ 
C269/55, ECR I-0000, judgment on the 29 March 2012. On appeal at the Court of Justice, Case C-
295/12 (see opinion of the Adv Gen Wathelet, 26 September 2013 accessible at 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2013-09/cp130117en.pdf). 
 
14
 ibid, 12. 
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Figure no. 2: Ownership Separation (energy sector, for instance, cases E.ON, 
RWE and ENI) (source: OECD Report 2001, p 13) 
 
This form of separation removes the incentive to discriminate downstream 
competition. The main disadvantage would be the potential loss of economies of 
scope from integration. The separation of the company controlling the network from 
the company/ies controlling the services is the most suitable at European level, 
considering that the AT&T form of separation (also called ‘club ownership 
separation’), horizontally dividing the group into local vertically-integrated companies 
can be considered equivalent, in size, to the co-existence of multiple vertically-
integrated telecoms groups in each European Member State.  
 
With respect to club ownership separation, the network of one vertically-integrated 
company is structurally separated on a local basis, preserving, in scale, vertical 
integration services/network (example: the creation of the ‘Baby Bells’ after the 
AT&T’s break-up). 
 
The scheme is as follows: 
 
Non-
competitive 
activity 
Competitive 
activity 
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Figure no. 3: Club ownership separation (case AT&T) (source: OECD Report 
2001, p 13) 
 
 
A fourth form of separation suggested by the OECD Report is the ‘operational 
separation’. It is also described as a hybrid of the previous three forms of separation, 
depending on the body which takes control of the non-competitive component 
(network)15. Therefore, if the governance is in the hands of the regulator, it is 
equivalent to regulatory separation (access regulation); if the governing body has 
representatives of the downstream firms, can be compared to joint or club ownership 
separation.  
 
This approach takes this form: 
 
 
                                                          
 
15
 ibid, 14. 
Non-competitive activity (network) 
Competitive 
activity 
(service) 
 
(services)  
Competitive 
activity 
(service) 
Competitive 
activity 
(services) 
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Control (but not ownership of the 
non-competitive component is assumed  
by a non-profit entity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure no. 4: operational separation (source: OECD Report 2001, p 15) 
 
This form of ‘operational separation’ or ‘operational unbundling’ was adopted in the 
electricity industry in the US. The Federal Trade Commission defined this form of 
operational separation as follows:  
 
«[it] has taken the form of an entity independent of the [electricity] utility 
operating the transmission and distribution grids to ensure open access 
and transparent pricing, although the monopolist retains ownership of the 
physical assets. The operational unbundling plan may work to preserve 
economies of vertical integration, internalise loop flow externalities 
(caused by the fact that electricity does not follow a contract path, but 
rather the path of least resistance), and assure transparent investment 
signals for potential investors while eliminating the strategic opportunities 
of the monopolist to subtly favour its own generation capacity»16. 
 
As per the OECD Report 2001 operational separation (or ‘unbundling’) is that 
adopted in the US electricity industry. The positions cited above are partially 
                                                          
 
16
 Federal Trade Commission, Prepared Statement of the FTC before the Committee on the judiciary 
US of representatives, 28 July 1999. 
 
Non – 
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accepted by the most recent OECD Report 2011 on structural separation17 published 
in conjunction with the amendments to the OECD Recommendation 200118 on 
structural separation in regulated industries, adopted on the 13 December 2011.  
 
The OECD Report 2011 states that «structural separation is a remedy of continued 
relevance, which can both advance the process of market liberalisation and address 
some of the difficulties inherent to behavioural remedies and more complex and 
intensive sector regulation […]. Nevertheless, structural separation may not be 
necessary or appropriate in all industries or markets [and] the impact of structural 
separation or the lack thereof on corporate incentive to invest in the network 
industries has become a prominent issue»19. To conclude; «the choice of structural 
versus behavioural measures, in a given set of circumstances, therefore remains a 
matter that requires careful evaluation»20. 
 
The Report stresses how at European level during the 2001/2011 decade there have 
been many successful examples of functional and structural separation. Some of 
them were implemented on the basis of voluntary commitments (or undertakings, in 
the UK experience)21: to make a few examples, BT’s functional separation occurred 
in 2006 and structural separation of E.ON22, RWE23 and ENI24 as part of 
                                                          
17
 OECD, Report on Experiences with Structural Separation, Paris, 2012, 10 (fn 6) (‘OECD 2011 
Report’), accessible at http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/50056685.pdf. 
 
18
 OECD, Recommendation 2011 on structural separation in regulated industries, C(2011) 135 and 
CORR1, accessible at 
http://www.oecd.org/regreform/liberalisationandcompetitioninterventioninregulatedsectors/recommend
ationconcerningstructuralseparationinregulatedindustries.htm. 
 
19
 ibid, 8. 
 
20
 ibid. 
 
21
 ibid, 10. 
 
22
 Commission Decision E.ON (Case COMP/38.388-38.389) of 26 November 2008, [2009] OJ C36/8 
of 13 February 2009, accessible at 
http://ec/europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39388/39388_2796_3.pdf. 
 
23
 Commission Decision RWE (Gas Foreclosure) (Case COMP/39.402) of 18 March 2009, Summary 
of the decision in [2009] OJ C133/10 of 12 June 2009 accessible at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39402/39402_576_1.pdf 
 
24
 Commission Decision ENI (Case COMP/39.315) of 29 September 2010, [2010] OJ C352/8 of 23 
December 2010, accessible at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39315/39315_3019_9.pdf 
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commitments signed with the European Commission in recent years (2008, 2009 
and 2010 respectively). 
 
It also underlines that functional separation and ownership vertical separation (or 
divestiture) were implemented in various Member States with respect to the 
electricity and gas sectors; whilst in the electronic communications markets 
functional or structural vertical separation «is presented as an exceptional measure 
for implementation only in cases of persistent market failure»25.  
 
The most interesting aspect of the OECD Report 2011 is that it stresses how, before 
choosing structural separation as a remedy, the regulatory or competition authorities 
should bear in mind the «trade-off between efficiency and competition»26. In other 
words, whilst there is a vast literature that shows that profit-maximising vertically-
integrated firms make efficient decisions, there are also arguments that underline 
how a bottle-neck monopoly can create major problems for competition. 
 
This dichotomy, competition versus efficiency, can be considered the main obstacle 
to support the opportunity of structural separation in vertically-integrated 
telecommunications companies. The OECD 2011 Report stresses that in any case in 
which structural or functional separation had to be decided the authorities faced the 
issue «whether separation measures will impact negatively on investment 
incentives»27. 
 
The OECD Report 2011 also underlines how, on the one hand, behavioural 
remedies are by their very nature more respectful of proportionality and of the rights 
of the parties, and are obviously more flexible, since they can be tailored to the 
specific conducts that need to be addressed. On the other hand, they tend to be too 
weak vis à vis highly concentrated industries and require monitoring by a large 
amount of people and resources.  
                                                          
 
25
 ibid.10. 
 
26
 ibid.12. 
 
27
 ibid, 109. 
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Structural remedies are the most ‘effective’, in legal terms. Once adopted they can 
only with difficultly be brought to the status quo ante, therefore they do not require 
high monitoring resources and can be put in place in the short term. However, they 
might have high transactional costs; they can be inefficient, in economic terms; they 
could potentially damage third party and could interfere with the technological 
development of the company, whilst reducing the incentive to competition. 
 
If wrongly applied, they can recreate the same anti-competitive situation, simply 
changing the actor(s) in a specific market.  
 
 
3. The role of the legal (‘effectiveness’) and economic (‘efficiency’) tests in 
choosing the best remedy, within the boundaries of competition law.  
 
In recent years there has been wide debate on what remedy is the most suitable, 
with respect to merger remedies as well as with respect to Art. 102 TFEU 
enforcement.  
 
Legal effectiveness means the capacity for a divested entity to remain a viable and 
effective competitor28, whilst economic efficiency measures the grade of efficacy of a 
proposed remedy pre-and post-merger; in other words, the effective impact that the 
remedy has on examined markets (in terms of level of prices, level of supply, survival 
of competitors, impact on the final consumers with respect to quality and level of 
prices). 
 
It is interesting to analyse and compare the remedies adopted in the presence of a 
proposed (or implemented) merger with the remedies that could be adopted in order 
to enhance the competitive environment in the presence of violations of Art. 102 
TFEU. In fact, only taking into consideration both factors (effectiveness and 
                                                          
28
 On the point see the excellent paper published by TAJAN-PAPANDROPOULOS, The merger 
remedies study: in divestiture we trust?, in European Competition Law Review, 2006, 443-354 (para 
2.2). 
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efficiency of the remedies) it is finally possible to decide which remedy will have the 
most suitable impact on a specific economic scenario.  
 
For a long time the European Commission has been arguing that only ‘structural 
remedies’ can be really effective, considering the difficulties deriving from ex post 
monitoring of a behavioural remedy. However, at least in the electronic 
communications sector, the Directive 2009/140/EC favoured, as a regulatory tool, 
functional separation. Functional remedy is directly linked with the idea of appointing 
a trustworthy monitoring trustee, both in mergers and in art. 102 TFEU enforcement. 
Monitoring trustees are widely used figure heads (both at EU level, and at national 
level) and ensure that the ‘undertakings’ signed by the merging parties (or the party 
that has accepted to divest or to carry out a certain number of obligations to address 
the competition authority concerns) are effectively implemented. 
 
The Commission (or the national competition authority), as correctly noted by 
TAJANA and PAPANDROPOULOS in their seminal article, may have a lack of 
expertise in a specific market29.Therefore, only a highly competent monitoring trustee 
could be a sufficient guarantee for the adoption of a less invasive remedy such as 
functional separation. Whilst preserving the integrity of the company, it may grant 
that over a certain time-frame the competition concerns are duly addressed, through 
the adoption of the measures that the Commission or the National Competition 
Authority and Regulators may have suggested as urgent to make the market under 
review more competitive.  
 
Leaving aside the effectiveness of the remedy, probably the most important aspect, 
still under-estimated, is the assessment of the economic impact of a long-term 
remedy (either structural either behavioural with a functional nature). Taking an 
economic perspective, at least in the short term, a structural remedy might not be the 
most efficient. There is a possibility that if the undertaking is forced to divest, it will 
                                                          
 
29
 TAJANA-PAPANDROUPOLOS, cited: «A third party, independent and with the necessary 
expertise, is needed to oversee the activities of the parties and effectively monitor compliance with the 
conditions set out in the Commission’s clearance decision». 
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dismiss the less economically vital part of its business30. It has been argued that 
there are good reasons in favour of the adoption of behavioural remedies, that may 
be more effective in those economies where the competition authorities work in 
combination with highly skilled Regulatory entities. Depending on the type of 
behavioural remedies may turn to be less intrusive disruptive.  
 
In 2000 US scholars such as SHELANSKI and SIDAK, pending the United States v 
Microsoft31 proceedings for abuse of dominant position against Netscape, proposed 
a three-fold test to assess the validity of a proposed divestiture, in order to  assess 
ex ante the impact that a (legally effective) remedy may have had in terms of 
economic efficiency32. For them the remedy (i) should produce a net gain in static 
economic efficiency; (ii) net gains in static economic efficiency should overcome 
potential losses in dynamic efficiency; (iii) enforcement costs should be taken into 
account. 
 
In the first case, the remedy is seen in the perspective of creating new competitors, 
or isolating an infrastructure that is finally opened up to multiple operators. The pro-
efficiency gains might be evident. Then the antitrust authority must take into account 
the risks that ‘dynamic efficiency’ is jeopardised by the presence of multiple players, 
on the one hand, and by the risk of disruptions pending on the head of the separated 
                                                          
30
 MOTTA stressed the risk that «inappropriate divestments may actually facilitate collusion by 
restructuring an industry in a more symmetric way or multiply multi-markets contacts». MOTTA-
POLO-VASCONCELOS, Merger Remedies in the EU: An Overview, in LEVEQUE-SHELANSKY 
(eds), Merger Remedies in American and European Union Competition Law, London, 2003, 106. 
 
31
 The Judge T. Jackson in his conclusion filed on the 3 April 2000 at the US District Court of the 
District of Columbia acknowledged the attempt of monopolising by Microsoft and ordered as a remedy 
the separation of the company in two entities, one to produce the operating system, and one to 
produce other software components. It is famous the opinion expressed in his ‘findings of fact’ filed on 
5 November 1999: «Most harmful of all is the message that Microsoft's actions have conveyed to 
every enterprise with the potential to innovate in the computer industry. Through its conduct toward 
Netscape, IBM, Compaq, Intel, and others, Microsoft has demonstrated that it will use its prodigious 
market power and immense profits to harm any firm that insists on pursuing initiatives that could 
intensify competition against one of Microsoft's core products. Microsoft's past success in hurting such 
companies and stifling innovation deters investment in technologies and businesses that exhibit the 
potential to threaten Microsoft. The ultimate result is that some innovations that would truly benefit 
consumers never occur for the sole reason that they do not coincide with Microsoft's self-interest». As 
known the judgment was partially overturned by the District Court of Appeals and remanded the case 
for consideration of a proper remedy under a more limited scope of liability. The case was ultimately 
settled and the separation was avoided. 
 
32
 SHELANSKY-SIDAK, Antitrust Divestiture in Network Industries, in Chicago Law Review, 2001, 1. 
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industry (network), on the other. The enforcement costs of a structural remedy may 
also be taken into account and depending on the market conditions (type of 
industry), might be high or low. 
 
As FARRELL and SHAPIRO discuss in their paper ‘Intellectual Property, 
Competition, and Information Technology’33, network effects may play a crucial role 
in deciding what remedy should be suggested. It must be said that authors like 
TAJANA correctly stressed the risks that a draconian remedy may also have on third 
parties (shareholders, employees), and takes also into consideration the impact of 
‘general interest’34. 
 
He pointed out how the Commission, or a national authority, rather than pursue the 
effectiveness of a legal remedy, should take into consideration the ‘thermometer’ 
provided by economic, efficiency-oriented, tests, which may be able to foresee the 
disruptions that a rather draconian remedy may cause.  
 
Finally it must be stressed that there are a limited number of studies on the impact of 
structural remedies in article 102 TFEU cases, because there are very few decisions 
at European level which have adopted structural separation as a way of enhancing 
competition35 (such as the above-mentioned commitments decisions adopted in the 
energy sector).  
 
 
4. Structural separation in the electronic communications: an option to be 
considered by the European enforcer.  
                                                          
 
33
 FARELL-SHAPIRO, Intellectual Property, Competition, and information Technology, Berkeley 
Competition Policy Centre Working Paper no. CPC-04-45, 2004. 
 
34
 TAJANA, Structural Remedies and Abuse of Dominant Position, TILEC Discussion Paper, Tilburg 
University, 2005. These concerns raised by several parties. See LITAN-NOLL–NORDHAUS-
SCHERER, Remedies Brief of Amici Curiae, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 27/4/2000, 64. 
 
 
35
 The main concern in Europe, since the creation of the early EEC, and until today, was the 
weakness of the national champions rather than their ‘dominant position’ or level of concentration.  
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Experience shows that functional separation as implemented in the United Kingdom 
with the creation of Openreach, as a functionally separated entity, represented only 
one of the possible forms of separation. It was tailored to the specific features of the 
company, to the alleged anticompetitive behaviours and to the features of the British 
market. 
 
After having analysed the various possible forms of separation as identified by the 
OECD report 200136, we can look at (and compare) three forms of separation: (i) 
functional, (ii) structural (internal corporate separation) and (iii) ownership 
separation, starting with the Openreach experience in the UK, looking at the 
progressive passage from operational to full structural separation of the national 
telecoms incumbent in Australia (Telstra) by 2018, and at the relatively recent 
(December 2011) voluntary ownership separation of the New Zealand telecoms 
incumbent (New Zealand Telecom). Functional separation represents a tighter form 
of operational separation, with the creation of internal ‘walls’ mainly hindering 
exchange of information within retail, wholesale and access divisions of the same 
company. The various divisions still belong to the same company, but each division 
acts as if it was a separate company. A very good synthesis: ‘they have to buy and 
sell services between each other in an internal market»37.  
 
The model adopted in the UK with Openreach follows this scheme: 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
36
 OECD, ‘Restructuring public utilities for competition’, Report on Competition and Regulatory 
Reform, 2001, accessible at 
http://www.oecd.org/regreform/liberalisationandcompetitioninterventioninregulatedsectors/19635977.p
df. 
 
37
 See the overview on separation by lawyers WATERS and DAMIAN, Separation regulation of 
dominant telecommunications operators in today’s legacy networks and tomorrow’s next generation 
networks. One separation model does not fit all – key design issues and lessons learned, accessible 
at http://www.gtlaw.com.au/wp-content/uploads/Separation-regulation.pdf, p. 2. 
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Figure no. 5: functional separation of BT, United Kingdom (2006)38 
 
Openreach, the access division, deals with the local network infrastructure, the fibre 
extension in local loop and the regional backhaul networks. It provides various 
services: ULLs services, ISDN, PSTN resale. On the other hand, BT Wholesale 
deals with (i) the electronics used on the network (including DSLAMS in local loop 
and regional backhaul network), (ii) all the other regulated services not provided by 
Openreach, and (iii) other most advanced communications services (e.g. wholesale 
local switched calls, layer 3DSL). BT Wholesale division, as shown in the chart, 
deals with its own wholesale customers and with BT retail customers, whilst 
Openreach provides access services to BT Wholesale division and to Wholesale 
customers on an equal footing. 
 
On the 16 July 2015 OFCOM launched its second Telecoms Review39, publishing a 
document open to responses until 6th October 2015. The targets of the review are to 
modify the current legislation in order to increase (i) investment and innovation, 
delivering widespread availability of services; (ii) sustainable competition, delivering 
                                                          
38
 ibid, 4. 
 
39
 OFCOM, Strategic Review of Digital Communications (‘Strategic Review’), accessible at 
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/consultations/dcr_discussion/summary/digital-comms-
review.pdf 
 
BT RETAIL 
BT 
WHOLESALE 
WHOLESALE 
CUSTOMERS 
OPENREACH 
(network units) 
DRAFT  - to be published in (2015) Vol 2 no. 12, Italian Antitrust Review 
 
19 
 
choice, quality and affordable prices; (iii) empowered consumers, able to take 
advantage of competitive markets; and (iv) targeted regulation where necessary, 
deregulation elsewhere. The OFCOM document considers the possibility of 
introducing structural separation 
 
«This has the potential to deliver benefits, since it would address BT’s 
underlying incentive to discriminate against competitors, and enable a 
simplified regulatory framework. It may also increase Openreach’s 
management focus on, and control over, network investment decisions 
and performance issues. However, to the extent those issues arise from a 
lack of competition to Openreach, it may not fully address them. It would 
be an intrusive and complex intervention both for BT and the rest of 
industry, with substantial implementation challenges. It would also require 
ongoing regulation to guard against excess returns by the structurally 
separate upstream ‘monopolist»40. 
 
 
The British Telecom’s Openreach solution was subject to criticism by its competitor  
Vodafone, that actually argued that structural separation should be considered as a 
new form of regulatory intervention41. Vodafone in particular claims that BT received 
an anti-competitive advantage benefiting of a 5-billion pounds broadband network 
financed with tax-payers money. 
 
Matters developed differently in Australia. After a long debate42 about the opportunity 
of adopting structural separation as recommended by the Australian government 
                                                          
40
 OFCOM, Strategic Review, 14. 
 
41
 The Guardian, ‘Vodafone calls for BT form separate broadband company’, 25 March 2015, at 
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/mar/25/vodafone-calls-for-bt-to-form-separate-broadband-
company, accessed on the 22.12.15. 
 
42
 Plans for structurally separate Telstra, the Australian incumbent, were discussed by a Senate 
committee since 2003. Telstra objected that structural separation would have led to class actions from 
shareholders. 
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since 200743, in 2012 undertakings were signed by Telstra leading to structural 
separation of the company44. As per Telstra website,  
 
«on 28 February 2012, the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission (ACCC) accepted Telstra’s Structural Separation 
Undertaking (SSU) and draft Migration Plan. The SSU commenced 
operation on 6 March 2012, while the Migration Plan took effect from 
7 March 2012. 
 
The SSU fulfils two roles: 
 It commits Telstra to structural separation by 1 July 2018, through the 
progressive disconnection of fixed voice and broadband services 
from Telstra’s copper and Hybrid Fibre-Coaxial (HFC) networks, 
while the New Broadband Network (NBN) is being rolled out [by the 
government45]; and, 
 It sets out the various measures which Telstra will put in place to 
provide for equivalence and transparency in the supply of regulated 
fixed network services to its wholesale customers and the supply 
of comparable services to its retail customers during the transition to 
the NBN»46. 
 
                                                          
43
 For the debate preceding structural separation of Telstra, see ‘Telstra Faces Enforced Split’, by 
Katharine Murphy and Jesse Hogan, The Age, 3 October 2007 accessible at 
http://www.theage.com.au/news/business/telstra-faces-enforced-
split/2007/10/02/1191091114582.html. 
 
44
 On 29 July 2011 Telstra submitted a structural separation undertaking and draft migration plan to 
the Australian Competition & Consumer Commission (ACCC) on the basis of Sections 577A and 
577BDA of the Telecommunications Act 1997. After a supplement of negotiation, the ACCC accepted 
on the 27 February 2012 Telstra’s structural separation undertaking and approved the draft migration 
plan. On the 6 March 2012, Telstra’s Structural Separation Undertaking and Migration Plan came into 
force. Detailed chronology and milestones are available at https://www.accc.gov.au/regulated-
infrastructure/communications/industry-reform/assessment-of-telstras-ssu-draft-migration-plan. 
 
45
 Brackets added. 
 
 
46
 Australian Competition Authority (ACCC), Structural Separation Undertakings offered by Telstra on 
the 23 February 2012, accepted by ACCC on the 28 February 2012, accessible at 
http://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/Structural%20Separation%20Undertaking.pdf. An outlook of 
Telstra’s structural separation undertaking is available both on the website of Telstra accessible at 
http://www.telstrawholesale.com.au/structural-separation-undertaking/index.htm, and from the website 
of the Australian Competition & Consumer Commission (ACCC). Particularly useful is the Telstra’s 
Structural Separation Undertaking Annual Compliance Report 2011-12, accessible at  
https://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/Telstra's%20structural%20separation%20undertaking%20annua
l%20compliance%20report%202011-12.pdf. 
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To understand how the Australian Competition & Consumers Commission (‘ACCC’) 
led the negotiations to the point of accepting undertakings leading to full structural 
separation (by 2018) of Telstra, it is important to consider that as per 1st December 
2006 the company was subject to operational separation, forcing it to keep separate 
retail, wholesale and key network services business units47. 
 
The Parliament of Australia however expressed serious concerns about the capacity 
of Telstra to grant full competition by simply implementing an operational separation 
scheme: 
 
«Telstra’s integrated position across all the telecommunications 
platforms has led to longstanding and widespread concerns that the 
existing telecommunications structure in failing consumers, businesses 
and the economy in general»48. 
 
Structural separation of Telstra (with the creation of a structurally-separated state-
funded New Broadband Network) was conceived as a step further than functional 
(operational) separation.  
 
An excerpt from ‘Telstra’s structural separation undertaking – Annual Compliance 
Report 2011-2012’ issued by the ACCC clarifies how the government found that 
functional (operational) separation was not enough. This has to be borne in mind, 
since the same reasoning might be applied to the European scenario, within single 
Member States: 
 
«In late 2010, the Australian Government introduced legislation which 
created a framework for reforming the telecommunications industry—
effecting structural separation of Telstra by the progressive migration of 
Telstra’s fixed line access services to the wholesale-only National 
Broadband Network (NBN) as the NBN fibre is rolled out49. This reform 
                                                          
47
 OECD Competition Committee, Report on Experiences with Structural Separation, PARIS, 2012, 
109-110, available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/50056685.pdf 
 
48
 Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, House of Representatives, Telecommunications 
Legislation Amendment (Competition and Consumer Safeguards) Bill 2009. Explanatory 
Memorandum, p 8. 
 
 
49
 Emphasis added. 
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recognised that Telstra, as the vertically integrated access provider to the 
ubiquitous copper network, operates at all levels of the supply chain and 
competes with the businesses that it supplies to. This has given rise to 
long standing competition concerns around Telstra’s ability and 
incentive to favour its retail business over other service providers 
accessing its network to the detriment of consumers.  
 
Prior to the commencement of the SSU, Telstra was subject to an 
operational separation framework which was intended to promote 
equivalence between Telstra’s wholesale and retail customers. The ACCC 
has previously publicly stated that the operational separation regime, 
and the ACCC’s limited role in investigating and reporting matters to 
the Minister, was largely ineffective in addressing Telstra’s ability 
and incentive to discriminate against its competitors50. Upon the 
coming into force of the Structural Separation Undertaking (SSU) on 6 
March 2012, the operational separation regime ceased to operate»51. 
 
 
The operational separation (for the period 2006-2012), preliminary to the structural 
separation of the NBN [New broadband Network] from Telstra’s wholesale and retail 
services, had been conceived in the ‘separation of the business units formalised 
through subsidiaries, so that each separated business unit is a subsidiary of a 
holding company rather than being an organisational unit within the one company. 
[A] common set of shareholders still owns the structurally separated subsidiaries»52.  
 
The chart that follows shows how operational (functional) separation (within the 
same group) had been put in place from 2006 to 2012: 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
50
 Emphasis added. 
 
51
 Australian Competition & Consumer Commission (ACCC), Telstra’s Structural Separation 
Undertaking – Annual Compliance Report 2011-2012, a Report to the Minister for Broadband, 
Communications and the Digital Economy, with letter of 13 April 2013, accessible 
http://www.accc.gov.au/publications/telstras-structural-separation-undertaking. With respect to the 
instructions that the ACCC gives to Telstra in order to address competition concerns during the 
current migration period, see ACCC press release of 7 February 2013, ‘ACCC directs Telstra to 
amend measures developed under the Migration Plan’, accessible at http://www.accc.gov.au/media-
release/accc-directs-telstra-to-amend-measures-developed-under-the-migration-plan. 
 
 
52
 See the overview on separation by lawyers WATERS and DAMIAN, Separation regulation of 
dominant telecommunications operators in today’s legacy networks and tomorrow’s next generation 
networks. One separation model does not fit all – key design issues and lessons learned, accessible 
at http://www.gtlaw.com.au/wp-content/uploads/Separation-regulation.pdf, p. 3. 
 
DRAFT  - to be published in (2015) Vol 2 no. 12, Italian Antitrust Review 
 
23 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure no. 6: operational separation of Telstra, Australia (2006-2012)53 
 
 
In this case, the fixed network is operationally separated from the provision of 
services. Telstra Wholesale does not operate the infrastructure, but supplies all 
wholesale services. An intermediate entity, ‘network support’, deals with the 
‘operations support systems’ (‘OSS’), and supports both retail and wholesale 
units. This first phase of operational separation can be compared to functional 
separation as per the BT’s Openreach model, and constitutes a preliminary step 
towards the current structural separation migration plan. During the phase of 
progressive structural separation 2012-2018 the functional separation model de 
iure ceases to exist54. 
 
                                                          
53
 ibid, 5. 
 
 
54
 See from Telstra Wholesale’s website, ‘High level summary of Telstra Structural Separation 
Undertaking and Migration Plan’, page 1, accessible at 
http://www.telstrawholesale.com.au/download/document/ssu-and-mp-briefing-summaries-1.pdf. It 
expressly says that ‘consistent with the Government’s decision to frame structural separation as an 
alternative to functional separation for Telstra under the legislative scheme, the Interim Equivalence 
and Transparency measures in the Structural Separation Undertakings (SSU) do not constitute 
functional separation’. See in particular the detailed migration plan outlined from page 3ff. 
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The interesting aspect of the Australian ‘restructuring plan’ launched in 2011 is 
that the deployment of the New Generation Network (New Broadband Network or 
‘NBN’) is conceived through the creation of a new infrastructure directly deployed 
by a separate, government owned, company55, so that all the players are put on 
an equal footing in the future provisions of wholesale services, including Telstra. 
 
This shows that since the New Generation Network substantially differs, from a 
technological point of view, from the traditional fixed-line copper networks on 
which broadband services are provided enhancing bandwidth through ADSL 
technology, the model of functional separation as implemented in the British 
telecommunications with Openreach is considered insufficient and not applicable 
in the Australian context. The Australian competition authority has adopted 
structural separation as a way of favouring the intervention of the government to 
create a ‘New Broadband Network’ (the entire operation should be completed by 
2018), so that Telstra « must not supply services to those premises [customers] 
using the copper or HFC networks (other than pay TV services in the case of the 
HFC).Telstra will satisfy this commitments by progressively decommissioning its 
copper customer access network (‘CAN’) and HFC broadband service on an area 
by area basis as the NBN rolls out»56. 
 
The new characteristics of the NBN are: 
 
(a) It will be realised as the largest civil works projects for decades; 
(b) There is still uncertainly on the future demand of services that will be 
provided by the NGNs; 
(c) There will be a constant and substantial investment to upgrade the 
networks; 
(d) NGNs are layered, open standard networks, compared to the vertically-
integrated technology of copper networks, barriers to entry at the 
                                                          
55
 ibid, 12. 
 
56
 Telstra Wholesale’s paper cited above, 1. 
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connectivity layers are lower and there is limited technological capability 
to leverage between layers57. 
 
Therefore the role of regulation, with respect to NGNs, will be much more linked to 
the creation of incentives to develop new infrastructures, than to the application of 
the traditional regulatory tools to deal with access-related bottlenecks58. 
 
In the Australian scenario, matters are going in a different direction with the 
progressive passage from functional to structural separation. The ACCC first tried to 
implement functional separation within the Telstra group (separating wholesale and 
retail services, while still operating the traditional network). When it was clear that 
discrimination between its own retail customers and wholesale customers, was still 
taking place, the ACCC pushed for the signature of undertakings preliminary to the 
creation of a structurally separated entity, funded by the State, that will be the main 
New Generation Network on which Telstra will provide its wholesale services in 
competition with any other telecommunications operator.  
 
In this respect, the creation of the New Generation Network as a separate entity 
represents a measure that is set to avoid once for all any access-related 
anticompetitive conducts. Quoting from the mentioned ‘Telstra’s Structural 
Separation Undertaking (‘SSU’) - Compliance Report 2011-2012’  
 
«[i]n introducing structural reform of the telecommunications industry, the 
government recognised that the ACCC would need stronger enforcement 
mechanisms that those under the operational separation regime to ensure 
transparency and equivalence. The SSU measures are a substantial 
improvement upon the previous operational59 separation framework and 
more effectively promote equivalence and transparency. The SSU 
provides for stronger enforcement mechanisms, which are particularly 
                                                          
 
57
 ibid. 
 
58
 ibid.  
 
 
59
 Here the word operational and functional is a synonym.  
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important for protecting competition and delivering outcomes in the 
interests of consumers and businesses, during the rollout of the NBN»60. 
 
Unfortunately, it is still premature to analyse quantitative data to see whether 
structural separation currently under implementation in Australia will have a positive 
impact on competition, prices and quality of the services provided. In that context the 
SSU were signed as a preliminary step towards the creation of a NBN, with the idea 
of putting Telstra and its competitors on an equal foot in the provisions of 
telecommunications services. Seen from a European perspective, it looks like the 
ACCC, suggesting complete structural separation by 2018, wants to create the pre-
conditions for the realisation (mainly at government’s costs) of a New Generation 
Network. Considering that the new network is technically different from the traditional 
copper wire network, it allows the presence of more players over the same 
infrastructures, and should de facto represent an opportunity of growth and 
development for that country. 
 
It is important to note that during the implementation of the structural separation 
undertakings (also called the ‘migration plan’ phase) Telstra is under constant 
scrutiny by the ACCC. Regulatory tools such as price caps will be still put in place 
during the transitional phase. However some features of the undertakings can be 
directly enforced by the ACCC before the Australian Federal Courts, through 
remedies that range from «fines to compensation orders and any other orders that 
the Court considers appropriate»61. 
 
If the ultimate scope of the undertakings signed by Telstra is that of structurally 
separate its network by 1st July 2018 by progressively disconnecting fixed telephony 
services on its copper network and broadband services on its hybrid fibre-coaxial 
(HFC) network, migrating these services onto the (wholesale-only) NBN rolled out by 
the government, Telstra management is aware that during the transitional phase the 
objective of the undertakings is to ensure equivalence and transparency in how 
Telstra treats retails and wholesale customers of regulated services on the copper 
                                                          
60
 Telstra’s USS Compliance Report 2011-2012, p 4. Emphasis added. 
 
61
 Telstra Wholesale’s action plan. 
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network62, a clear indication of the concerns raised by the ACCC during the phases 
of negotiation of the structural separation undertakings63. The incumbent recently 
showed that is confident to respect the roadmap set in 2012 with the ACCC, and will 
be able to complete structural separation by 201864. 
 
The New Zealand Telecom experience is a third model of separation to be 
considered. They went a step further than in other jurisdictions, with the national 
incumbent de-merging into two listed entities: Chorus and Telecom New Zealand, 
with different share ownership65. 
 
In 2005 the New Zealand government launched a review of the telecommunications 
sector66, with a particular focus on broadband development. On the basis of the 
review, on December 2006 the government passed the ‘Telecommunications 
                                                          
 
62
 See Telstra’s SSU Compliance in 2012-2013, introduction, accessible at 
http://www.telstrawholesale.com.au/download/document/telstra-commitment-ssu-compliance-2012-
2013.pdf . 
 
63
 To follow the developments of the undertakings signed by Telstra before the ACCC, a useful link is 
http://www.accc.gov.au/regulated-infrastructure/communications/industry-reform/telstras-structural-
separation-undertaking. 
 
64
 ADHIKARI, Telstra ready to push on with structural separation, Technology spectator, 18 March 
2014, accessible at https://www.businessspectator.com.au/news/2014/3/18/technology/telstra-ready-
push-structural-separation. In June and October 2014 Telstra put forward two proposals of 
rectification of the commitments signed with the ACCC. In particular, «[u]nder clause 9(a) of the SSU 
Telstra has an obligation to ensure that particular aspects of retail and wholesale services will be 
equivalent (the ‘overarching equivalence commitment’). Under Schedule 11 to the SSU, Telstra may 
report possible breaches of the overarching equivalence commitment and must, no later than 30 days 
after reporting the possible breach, submit a proposal to the ACCC which sets out the steps that 
Telstra proposes to take to remedy the possible breach (a ‘rectification proposal’). The ACCC may 
accept a rectification proposal or if satisfied that it does not provide an effective remedy for the 
possible breach, reject the rectification proposal and direct Telstra to take alternative steps to remedy 
the possible breach». See https://www.accc.gov.au/regulated-infrastructure/communications/industry-
reform/telstras-structural-separation-undertaking, accessed on the 22.12.2015. 
 
65
 WATERS-DAMIAN, cited, 5.  
 
 
 
66
 Ministry of Economic Development, ‘Stocktake Process, stakeholder Input and Supporting 
documents’ (POL/1/27/10/2/1), published on 20 April 2006. 
 
DRAFT  - to be published in (2015) Vol 2 no. 12, Italian Antitrust Review 
 
28 
 
Amendment Act’ 67 requiring a ‘robust operational separation’ of the vertically-
integrated, privatised telecommunications incumbent, Telecom New Zealand, into at 
least three business units, to provide wholesale, retail and local access services68. 
 
The operational separation proposed in 2006 envisaged three pro-competition 
targets: 
 
(i) To promote competition in telecommunications markets for the long-term 
benefit of end users of telecommunications services in New Zealand; (ii) to 
require transparency, non-discrimination, and equivalence of supply in relation to 
certain telecommunications services; and (iii) to facilitate efficient investment in 
telecommunications infrastructure and services69. 
 
Operational separation was implemented on 31 March 2008. Telecom New Zealand 
therefore comprised «five customer-facing business units:  
 
(i) a retail unit providing fixed line, mobile and internet services to 
consumers and small and medium business customers; 
(ii) an operationally separate wholesale business unit providing next 
generation wholesale network products to service providers; 
(iii) an operationally separate unit that manages Telecom’s local access 
network;  
(iv) a specialised unit that provides technology services for lager business 
customers; and, 
(v) an Australian subsidiary providing telecommunications services in 
Australia»70.  
 
                                                          
67
 New Zealand Parliament, Telecommunications Amendment Act (No2) 2006. 
 
68
 ibid, sect. 32, inserting a new Part 2A into the Telecommunications Act2001. See OECD Report 
2012, cited, p 77-78. 
 
69
 New section 96A of the New Zealand Telecommunications Act 2001. 
 
 
70
 OECD Report 2011 ‘Experiences with Structural Separation’, cited, 78-79. 
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The model of operational separation of Telecom New Zealand was summarised 
by the following chart 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure no. 7: New Zealand MARK I operational separation model, preliminary to 
ownership (structural) separation of CHORUS (local network) from 1st December 
201171. 
 
 
In the chart Chorus represented the business unit managing the local network (not 
necessarily fibre-network), the regional backhaul networks (not the electronic 
equipment) and the information system to support Chorus’s services (but not to 
support shared services). The Telecom Wholesale, on the other hand, did not own 
assets, since these belong to the Network Units72. 
 
This process of operational (functional separation) finally resulted in ownership 
separation of the network from the core wholesale and retail business, bringing the 
monopoly of New Zealand Telecom to an end. On 30 November 2011 the ‘de-
merger’ process was completed, with Telecom New Zealand and Chorus becoming 
                                                          
71
 WATERS-DAMIAN, cited, 5. 
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separate listed companies73 (in literature also referred as Telecom New Zealand 2 
and Chorus 2): 
 
«On December 1, 2011 New Zealand telecommunications created a world 
first when the incumbent provider, Telecom, structurally separated and its 
network access division, Chorus, became a stand-alone, publicly listed 
company»74.  
 
This is the sole case of (voluntary) full ownership structural separation already 
implemented that I was able to identify. As I will discuss later, on an empirical point 
of view, also in this case the time-window to assess whether in New Zealand 
structural separation led to (i) increase in competition, (ii) reduction in costs and 
(wholesale and retail) prices and (iii) enhanced quality of services is too short.  
 
In September 2010 structural (and ownership) separation of Telecom New Zealand 
was preceded by the launch of a sector inquiry by the New Zealand Ministry of 
Economic Development, on the basis of its ‘discussion document’ on ‘Regulatory 
implications of structural separation’75. 
 
The document states that the national incumbent announced (2010) its intention to 
consider structural separation through the demerger into two companies of its 
assets, within the framework of the Government’s ultra-fast broadband initiative76. 
The Ministry made clear that any change in the existing regulatory regime should 
have been consistent with the principle of «promotion of competition in 
                                                          
 
73
 PUTT, After Structural Separation – New Zealand telecommunications a year after Telecom New 
Zealand and Chorus became separate companies, in Computer World New Zealand, 2012, 6-7. See 
also New Zealand Herald, 1
st
 December 2011, accessible at 
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/news/article.cfm?c_id=3&objectid=10769994. See also PULLAR-
STRECKER, ‘Telecom split first in world’, Fairfax NZ News, 27 October 2011, accessible at 
http://www.stuff.co.nz/business/industries/5858284/Telecom-split-first-in-world. 
 
74
 PUTT, cited, 6. 
 
75
 Ministry of Economic Development, ‘Discussion document – Regulatory Implications of Structural 
Separation’, September 2010, accessible at http://www.med.govt.nz/sectors-industries/technology-
communication/pdf-docs-library/communications/telecom-separation/regulatory-implications-of-
structural-separation-september-2010.pdf. 
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telecommunications markets for the long-term benefit of end-users of 
telecommunications services within New Zealand»77, in the hope that «the likely 
model of structural separation would lower barriers to entry at the retail level, by 
removing incentives to discriminate against competitors who operate at the retail 
level. There is scope in these circumstances for removing regulatory provisions 
which deal with the interface between wholesale and retail levels of the market. 
However there would be some residual vertical integration between the network and 
the wholesale layers of the business, so some incentives to discriminate against 
competitors would likely to remain»78. 
 
The voluntary structural separation of the network company Chorus from its mother 
company Telecom New Zealand in reality was the only way to ensure that Telecom 
New Zealand could take part of the roll out of the new ultra-fast broadband (UFB) 
network mainly rolled out at government’s expenses. One of the main advantages for 
the mother company was to be ‘relieved’ by the sector regulations, while Chorus 
would have continued to control the local copper and fibre network, dealing with 
wholesale business complaining with the sector regulations79. 
 
Therefore, in the Telecom New Zealand voluntary structural separation example we 
face a combination of industrial strategy (make possible for Telecom New Zealand to 
be part of the roll-out of the New Generation Network (UFB) without controlling the 
existing network too) and of government’s support for what was considered a pro-
competitive initiative80, also considering that Chorus would have continued to be 
subject to sectorial regulation. At the same time also Chorus, in the after break-up 
scenario, would have been allowed to participate to up to 70% of the new UFB, 
                                                          
77
 ibid. 
 
78
 ibid, 11. 
 
79
 PUTT, cited, 8-23. In May 2011 the managers of Telecom New Zealand announced that they would 
have been partner of the government’s UFB network (22).  
 
80
 Ministry of Economic Development, ‘Discussion document – Regulatory Implications of Structural 
Separation’, September 2010, accessible at http://www.med.govt.nz/sectors-industries/technology-
communication/pdf-docs-library/communications/telecom-separation/regulatory-implications-of-
structural-separation-september-2010.pdf. 
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receiving de facto a (interest-free) loan from the government of NZ$ 929 million, to 
be repaid between 2025 and 203681.  
 
In the first year from the break-up (November 2011/November 2012) 100,000 
households (urban users) were connected with the new ultra-fast broadband 
network82, demonstrating that structural separation did not cause disruption. 
 
It is important to highlight here that in some highly dynamic OECD economies, such 
as Australia and New Zealand, structural separation in the electronic 
communications, in the form of separation of the network from communications 
services, was not considered a taboo and was adopted as a valid option by the 
respective competition authorities, sector regulators and governments.  
 
Even though the Australian and New Zealand scenarios are different under a 
competition law point of view (Telstra signed structural separation undertakings 
before the Australian competition authority as a remedy to enhance competition, 
while Telecom New Zealand voluntarily decided to break-up from its own network in 
order to be put in condition to strategically invest in the new generation network), 
they must be borne in mind as two examples that contradict the claims of inefficiency 
and impracticability of the  structural remedy.  
 
 
5.  Functional or structural separation: two possible options also for the 
Italian scenario.  
 
In Italy the presence of network-related abuses, offers a good case to ask the 
question of whether high pecuniary fines may represent a serious deterrent for 
national incumbents.  
 
                                                          
81
 According to PUTT’s book, during the transitional phase preceding the complete roll-out of the UFB 
network, 99% of Chorus revenues still come from fixed telephony services provided over the 
traditional copper network. 
 
82
 PUTT, cited, 24. 
 
DRAFT  - to be published in (2015) Vol 2 no. 12, Italian Antitrust Review 
 
33 
 
The question is whether the electronic communications regulator , in the presence of 
recurrent abuses, could suggest the national competition authority to adopt a more 
draconian remedy such as structural separation? If so, what type of structural 
separation would be most suitable among those discussed?  
 
The Italian Communications Authority (Autorità per le garanzie nelle Comunicazioni, 
‘AGCOM’) on 2 May 2007, launched a public consultation process83 in order to 
discuss the possibility of introducing into the Italian legal system structural or 
functional separation of the communications infrastructure at present still controlled 
by the incumbent. During the 2007 consultation process, the AGCOM pointed out 
that, as per AGCOM decision no. 152/02/CONS of 2002, two set of provisions had 
been already introduced in the Italian legal system establishing (i) general measures 
to grant full application of the principle of non-discrimination; and (ii) specific duties 
(or remedies) for all the relevant markets. AGCOM claimed that in line with the 
fundamental targets of competition law at European level it had already established 
the ‘administrative separation’ of Telecom Italia, in order to facilitate non–
discriminatory access to the network resources held by the dominant operator. 
However, mere accounting separation did not impede Telecom Italia from carrying 
out a series of (network) access-related abuses, sanctioned with pecuniary fines with 
a very low deterrence impact, considering the recidivism.  
 
AGCOM decision 208/07/CONS states that the Italian Competition Authority, before 
the adoption of the above-mentioned AGCOM decision no. 152/02/CONS, had 
issued a non-binding opinion theoretically favourable to structural (company or 
ownership) separation. It actually stated that the best remedy would have been 
structural separation, since it would have produced: (i) the greatest fairness in the 
attribution of joint costs to the separate entities, facilitating the interpretation of the 
access rate to the infrastructure or for the provision of wholesale or retail services; 
(ii) the elimination of incentives to continue anticompetitive behaviours, since the two 
legal entities (network and service provider) would have had two different and 
                                                          
 
83
 AGCOM decision no. 208/07/CONS of 2 May 2007 (entitled ‘Avvio di una consultazione pubblica 
sugli aspetti regolamentari relativi all’assetto della rete di accesso fissa ed alle prospettive delle reti di 
nuova generazione a larga banda’), available at 
http://www.agcom.it/provv/d_208_07_CONS/d_208_07_CONS.htm 
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separate business targets84. The AGCOM decision 208/07/CONS, triggering the 
consultation process, pointed out that one of the most relevant forms of abuse is the 
possibility for vertically-integrated operators to lower (‘squeeze’) the competitors’ 
profit margins by raising the access cost or reducing retail prices. In both cases, it is 
difficult for the competitor to survive within the same market, since its profits are 
either cut by excessively high entrance costs (access price) or by excessively low 
retail prices85. 
 
Here the issue at stake is whether functional separation would have been successful 
in the long term (i) in all those countries where the incumbent is prone to repeat the 
same type of abuse, (ii) in those countries where it can be demonstrated that 
administrative judiciary reviews routinely lead to a substantial reduction of fines 
imposed by the NCAs or (iii) where the difficulty of monitoring  ‘functional separation’ 
of the incumbent through the creation of a (truly) separated access division may put 
in serious doubt the effectiveness of the remedy (as we have just discussed in the 
Telstra case above). 
 
The main objective of the Italian Communications Authority today is to achieve 
enhanced facilities-based competition. The key problems are much the same as 
those existing at the beginning of the process of liberalisation:  
 
(i) dominance of the incumbent, Telecom Italia, in the fixed telecommunications 
wholesale and retail markets; (ii) the very high market share of Telecom Italia in the 
broadband services market86; (iii) insufficient (or, in some areas, non-existent) 
diffusion of broadband services; (iv) the large ‘digital-divide’ for a significant share of 
Italian population87.  
                                                          
 
84
 ibid, 54-55. 
 
85
 ibid, 75. 
 
86
 Here a substantial difference must be taken into account with the UK scenario: BT’s broadband 
wholesale market share is of just 27%: OFCOM, ‘The Communications Market 2009’, August 2009. 
This is a factor that may justify a lower interest of BT to invest in the further enhancement of the New 
Generation Access network, and also a progressively reduced need of functional (and, a fortiori, 
structural) separation for the British incumbent. 
 
87
 AGCOM decision no. 208/07/CONS, p 80. 
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The competitive scenario in terms of the fixed line network is nearly identical to that 
observed at the start of the liberalisation process. Amongst the most significant (and 
recent) instances of abusive conducts decided against Telecom Italia, it is useful to 
recall a case tackled by the Italian Competition Authority88 in which it was 
acknowledged that Telecom Italia, from 2001 to 2003, abused its dominant position 
through margin squeeze conducts, in particular by offering low-price broadband 
services to public administration premises and business clients. Telecom Italia 
violated the principle of non-discrimination and favoured its commercial divisions, 
damaging the commercial divisions of its competitors by charging excessive prices 
for the wholesale services (i.e. unbundling services)89. Similar conclusions were 
reached by an arbitration panel settling litigation between Telecom Italia and 
Fastweb90 in 2007. The panel ascertained that Telecom Italia had obstructed access 
to the local loop (ULL) in at least 10.000 cases between 2001 and 2004. 
 
It must be noted that on 14 February 2008, pending the review/consultation carried 
out by the Italian regulator regarding the best remedy (functional v. structural 
separation) to deal with the access to Telecom Italia’s network, the management of 
the latter published the decision adopted by the board of directors to (spontaneously) 
implement in the following months a ‘form of’ functional separation. Telecom Italia 
created a separated division called ‘Open Access’ (clearly tailored on the Openreach 
model), within the Direction ‘Regulatory & Network’ aimed at dealing with the access 
issues. In reality the ‘separation’ proposed could be considered as an advanced form 
of ‘accounting separation’ rather than a complete ‘functional separation’, since 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
88
 Italian Competition Authority (AGCM), decision no. 13752, Case A351 – Abusive conducts of 
Telecom Italia, of 16 November 2004, in Bulletin no. 47/2004 of the Italian Competition Authority. 
 
89
 It must be noted that also the Consiglio di Stato, the Italian highest administrative court, reached 
the same conclusions, as may be inferred reading the judgment of 10 February 2006, quashing the  
appeal judgment of the Administrative Tribunal (Tribunale Amministrativo del Lazio). In particular it 
recommended for the Italian Communications Authority to adopt new regulations underpinning the 
principle of non-discrimination. 
 
90
 The litigation between Telecom Italia and Fastweb was settled through recourse to an arbitration 
panel chaired by prof. Guido Alpa on 27 January 2007 with the payment of EUR 60 million by 
Telecom Italia to Fastweb for negligence in obstructing the unbundling of local loop in the period of 
time 2001-2004 for at least 11.000 clients. See press release issued by the damaged company at 
http://company.fastweb.it/index.php?sid=19&idc=1109. 
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Telecom Italia’s ‘Open Access’ Division could not be considered functionally or 
legally separated from the parent company Telecom Italia. In the following months 
(11 December 2008) AGCOM accepted the ‘undertakings’ proposed by Telecom 
Italia and considered the creation of the separate division ‘Open Access’ in line with 
the European directives (in line with the obligations of accounting separation, 
neutrality, non-discrimination). In March 2011 Telecom Italia officially announced that 
the ‘Open Access’ division was fully operational91. However the measure appears to 
be still some way from addressing the competition concerns, and certainly does not 
interfere with the control of the network, and in particular, with the decision-making 
process with respect to new investments92. 
 
For the sake of completeness, in May 2009 the so-called ‘Caio Report’93 was 
published. It suggested various measures to enhance competition while helping 
innovation in the network. The measures in the report range from simple functional 
separation to structural separation, for certain respect anticipating the initiatives 
adopted in Australia and in New Zealand only a few years.  
 
In September 2010 the President of the Italian Competition Authority declared that 
he was not a priori against the intervention of the a State-controlled financial entity 
(Cassa Depositi e Prestiti94) to create the New Generation Network structurally 
separated from the national incumbent, and that he would have been also 
theoretically favourable to the creation of a joint-venture of Telecom Italia with its 
main competitors if the target was to bridge the digital divide of the country. 
                                                          
 
91
 On 9 March 2011 also the French competition authority announced that was in talk with the national 
de French regulator (Autorité Reglémentation des communications éléctroniques et des Postes, or 
‘ARCEP’) aimed at functionally separating France Télécom’s network, on the model of the British 
Openreach. ARCEP had already anticipated this intention in an informal publication on its periodic 
newsletter (La Lettre, no. 55, April 2007). 
 
92
 On the 25 July 2013, the Italian Communications Authority (AGCOM) accepted the proposal of 
(functional) separation of the access network offered by Telecom Italia, alongside with the creation of 
an ‘Equivalence of Input’ (EOI) access mechanism. The next step is to launch a market study 
interviewing all the Italian telecoms operators. The press release is available at 
http://www.agcom.it/default.aspx?message=visualizzadocument&DocID=11566. 
 
93
 After the name of the manager, Francesco Caio, who presented the report to the Italian government 
in 2009. 
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Structural separation for the time being was not considered a viable option95, but was 
at least discussed for the first time with respect to one of the largest European 
telecoms players. 
 
In certain respects, the solutions considered in Italy mirror the solutions adopted both 
in Australia and in New Zealand analysed above. In both cases competition law 
concerns and the government’s agenda to innovate the communications 
infrastructure in these three countries (New Zealand, Australia and Italy) are behind 
the idea of infrastructure separation from the body of the telecommunications 
incumbent providing wholesale and retail services. The substantial difference is that 
in New Zealand and, by 2018, in Australia, structural separation is a reality, 
supported also by the competition authorities. 
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